RE: Statistics and Firestone

["John Borio" <JJBorio-fgi@rmci.net>]

While still on tire quality....  There is an interesting story on Dr. J.M.
Juran's web site titled:

Khrushchev's Venture into Quality Improvement.

Dr. J. M. JURAN

The comprehensive history of quality control is a book in quest of an
author. That historian-to-be will face a Herculean task, since quality
control history is to be found in all centuries and in all cultures. A
particularly fascinating tale is related in (of all places) the biography
Khrushchev Remembers1

The year is 1939. Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, now 45 years old, is a high
official in the Soviet Union, being a full member of the Politbureau as well
as first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Khrushchev is also a
man of considerable experience – miner, factory worker, soldier, manager,
political worker, etc. He has had leadership roles in such projects as
reconstruction of Moscow and building the Moscow Metro (subway), and has
acquired a reputation as a doer.

Under an edict of Stalin prohibiting top officials from flying, Khrushchev
would sometimes travel from Kiev to Moscow (about 800 kilometers) by
automobile. On one of these trips his chauffeur, Alexandr Zhuravlev, advised
Khrushchev that the automobile tires then being issued were wearing out too
soon, and that there were sidewall blowouts on tires that were virtually
brand new. Zhuravlev had been Khrushchev's chauffeur for many years, and was
respected and trusted.

Khrushchev reported the facts to Stalin. Stalin became upset, but the report
was not news. There had been a lot of complaints about bad tires. Stalin's
reaction was to propose that Khrushchev take on the job of improving the
quality of tires. Khrushchev protested that he was unfamiliar with the
rubber industry, but it did not matter. He was told: "So familiarize
yourself."

A quality improvement committee was set up with Khrushchev as chairman.
After some meetings and a report to Stalin, he was directed to go to the
Yaroslavl tire factory, reputedly the best in the industry.

Khrushchev started his factory visit by seeing the shop operation – how the
plies and cords were built up. He was impressed by the skill of the workmen.
He also sensed that it was important to apply the cords evenly to avoid
failure. In addition, he sensed that there must be enough cords to resist
the stresses of use. His suspicions now converged into a theory.

The Yaroslavl plant had originally been purchased from an American company.
Khrushchev asked to see what manufacturing process had been prescribed by
the Americans and what deviations had been made from this prescribed
process. Khrushchev's suspicions turned out to be well founded. On an
earlier occasion the then head of the People's Commissariat of Transport
(Lazar M. Kaganovich) had made an inspection tour and a study of production
methods. He had recommended cost improvements by reducing the number of
layers of cord and by reducing the gage of the reinforcing wires. These
changes had made "a giant step forward" by increasing productivity beyond
the level achieved by American workers. Moreover, there was at the time
great stress on productivity, e.g., the factory maintained a highly visible
"honor board" showing photographs of the best producers.

Khrushchev's committee recommended a return to the original process because
the increased productivity had reduced the tire life by a shocking 90
percent, i.e., tires made by the original process had ten times the life.
They also recommended lowering the output norms. "We were learning that if
you aim for a level of productivity [that] deprived workers of a chance to
do quality work, the product will be spoiled." Stalin not only approved the
recommendations – he urged abolition of the "honor boards" at the tire
factory.

With the restoration of the correct production procedure, the factories were
again turning out durable tires. Tests were conducted to measure tire life
and prizes went to factories whose tires did well on the life tests.

The foregoing incident provides an interesting glimpse into some of the very
difficult problems faced decades ago by the leadership of the Soviet Union
in industrializing their economy. Aside from that fascinating and as yet
untold history, the incident recalls to us some violations of sound quality
control principles which we can see now and then in our decade and in all
economies:

•	A change in methods is made without securing assurance that there is no
damage to quality.

•	Emphasis is placed on one parameter of the economy (productivity) to such
an extent that the managers are driven to improve departmental performance
at the expense of overall economics.

•	Means are provided for measuring productivity but not quality.

•	The decision of adequacy of quality is based on conformance to
specification rather than on fitness for use.

•	Due to a lack of direct feedback from user to producer, unfitness for use
goes on and on until top management becomes alerted sufficiently to demand
action.

It is also of interest to "professionals" in quality control that the leader
of the quality improvement team had no prior knowledge of the technology of
the industry in question. Instead, he was a determined, practical manager
whose instincts for results are evident at every turn:

•	He believed the report of his chauffeur as a man whom he knew he could
trust.

•	He disliked waste sufficiently to bring the bad news to a powerful man who
was known to resent hearing bad news.

•	He was honestly skeptical that someone not familiar with the industry
could be of help in solving the problem.

•	He did put together a committee which included experts from the industry.

•	He did not limit himself to listening to the experts; he went down to the
factory floor to see for himself.

•	He presented his conclusions to the same powerful leader who was
predictably "terribly irritated by what I was telling him."

It is too late now, but Khrushchev would have been a most interesting client
to a quality control consultant!

References
1 Crankshaw, Edward (commentator) and Talbott, Strobe (editor), Khrushchev
Remembers, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, Vol. I, pp. 119-125. (Both the
publisher and commentator insist that the source material is genuine.)